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abstract 
Three hundred smallholders near Malang in East Java were surveyed of whom 150 were 
participating in a hybrid seed contract with Pioneer Hybrid International Inc, an American 
MNC that has been contracting in the area since 1986.  The objectives of the study were to 
determine  whether  the  contract  improved  the  welfare  of  those  who  participated  and,  if 
participation did improve welfare, to evaluate why this contract, in contrast to many other 
farm contracts in developing countries, is successful.  A transaction cost framework was used 
to specify a framework for probit analysis of contract participation and regression analysis 
used  to  measure  the  contribution  made  by  contract  participation  to  gross  margins.    The 
empirical results suggest (i) contract selection was by Pioneer and not through self-selection, 
(ii) the contract is likely to favour larger farmers and (iii) the Pioneer contract improved 
returns to farm capital and hence was likely to be welfare improving for contractors.  The 
success  of  the  contract  over  many  years  was  attributed  to  the  nature  of  the  contracting 
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1.  Introduction 
Market liberalisation, combined with the influences of changing dietary habits and technical 
change, is increasing production and trade in High Value Food (HVF) products such as seed, 
horticultural products, spices and certain vegetables (Friedland, 1994).  Watts and Goodman 
(1997) describe this as the emergence of ‘New Agricultural Countries’, NACs, where exports 
of traditional crops such as cereals, sugar and tropical beverages are declining while exports 
such  as  Brazilian  citrus,  Mexican  ‘non-traditionals’,  exotics  such  as  Kenyan  off-season 
vegetables and Chinese shrimp from Argentina are becoming an increasing proportion of both 
total and export agricultural income.  Much of this market development has been underpinned 
by contracts between agribusiness firms and smallholders in developing countries (Jaffee, 
1994).   
The net effect of contract farming on the welfare of smallholders has been controversial.  A 
number of authors express concern that contractors favour larger growers and hence poorer 
growers may be left out of the development process (CDC, 1989; Runsten, 1992; and Little 
and  Watts,  1994).    Other  hazards  of  contract  farming  are  potential  for  ‘capture’  of 
smallholders within contracts, negative social effects of the ‘cash economy’, narrowing of 
local  markets  as  contracted  production  squeezes  out  local  food  production,  deteriorating 
contract  terms  as  contracts  mature  and  general  concerns  about  how  multi-national 
corporations behave in developing countries (Clapp, 1988; Wilson, 1990; Little and Watts, 
1994; Torres, 1997; Singh, 2000).  Positive evaluations of contract farming generally indicate 
farmers either benefit from contracts in terms of enhanced profits or get out of them.  Benefits 
from contract participation result from improved access to markets, credit and technology, 
better management of risk, improved family employment and, indirectly, empowerment of 
women and development of a successful  commercial culture (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; 
Runsten, 1992; Key and Runsten, 1999; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001).   
In this study, we surveyed 300 smallholders near Malang in East Java.  Of these, 150 were 
participating in a hybrid seed contract with Pioneer Hybrid International Inc
3, an American 
MNC that has been contracting in the area since 1986.  Our objectives included finding out 
whether  farmers  who  participated  in  the  contract  were  better  off  than  those  who  did  not 
participate and understanding the reasons why this particular contract seemed so successful 
when there have been so many failed contract farming schemes in the past.  The study uses a 
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transaction cost framework, described in the next section of the paper, which is followed by 
sections  describing  the  contract  and  survey  and  statistical results  and  then  a  section  with 
discussion and conclusions. 
2.  Theoretical Background 
2.1  Transaction Cost Framework  
Contract farming between multinationals (or other large corporations) and smallholders in 
developing countries may appear to be a peculiar relationship given the dramatic differences 
in asset position and organisational capacity of the two actors.  To evaluate contract farming, 
it is important to consider why such a relationship would emerge, particularly as opposed to 
other types of market structures.  In this section, we consider a transaction cost framework in 
order to understand this relationship. 
Williamson  (1979)  developed  a  cost-based  framework  for  understanding  firms’  decisions 
about transacting.  He argued that the structure to emerge in a market would be that which 
minimised transaction costs to participants.  In his framework, transaction costs are functions 
of three specific elements in a market: bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity, 
without  which  markets  would  be  simple  exchange  systems  with  no  vertical  or  horizontal 
integration  of  productive  activities.    Dietrich  (1994)  and  Dorward  (2001)  provide  formal 
introductions  to  transaction  cost  problems  in  agriculture,  however,  some  examples  are 
sufficient here to convey the flavour of the approach.   
Bounded  rationality  describes  differences  in  information  between  would-be  buyers  and 
sellers.  For example, an agribusiness firm may have an excellent knowledge of markets while 
smallholders may have little knowledge of them, hence, there may be benefits from a contract 
that  informs  smallholders  about  opportunities.    Opportunism  may  occur  when  there  are 
opportunities  for  taking  advantage  of  situations  to  the  detriment  of  the  other  party  in  an 
agreement.  For example, smallholders may be concerned the firm could, by virtue of its 
market domination, offer a very low price in the spot market or, alternatively, the firm may be 
concerned that sellers could collude to drive up prices.  Writing contracts clearly spelling out 
obligations may reduce these types of concerns.  Asset specificity reflects risks associated with 
protecting ‘sunk costs’ in processing plants, logistical systems or market development or, for 
smallholders, costs of protecting investments in specialised machinery and knowledge.  Both 
firm and smallholders may seek to protect these investments through contracting.   4 
An agribusiness firm wishing to source new HVF products has a number of options.  One 
option  is  to  make  purchases  in  the  spot  market.    However,  such  markets,  particularly  in 
developing countries, may be missing or have high transaction costs related to uncertainties 
about  supply,  prices  and  or  quality.    Uncertain  supplies  and  volatile  prices  result  from 
thinness  in  new  markets.  Tight  quality  requirements  reflect  difficulties  with  preserving, 
packaging, freezing and providing transport while meeting requirements of fussy developed 
country consumers (Goodman and Watts, 1997).  Smallholders wishing to supply products to 
new HVF spot markets may also face high transaction costs.  There may be only one or a few 
big buyers for a new commodity, technical requirements may be difficult to understand and 
production and market information scarce.   
The outcome of these high transaction costs in emerging spot markets for HVF products is 
that agribusiness firms and smallholders look for alternative ways to transact through partial 
or complete vertical integration.  Two options are plantations (complete vertical integration) 
and contract farming (partial vertical integration) where the choice between the two would be 
based on relative transaction costs.  With plantations, transaction costs that would not be 
encountered in contracted production include land acquisition costs, skilled management, high 
levels of supervision to counteract agency problems and political problems (Stiglitz, 1974; 
Coulter et al., 1999).  Against these disadvantages, plantations may confer more predictable 
supply and lower unit costs resulting from scale economies.  Hayamai and Otsuka (1993) 
argue HVF crops are technically more sophisticated and require more worker initiative and 
hence  need  greater  supervision,  all  factors  working  against  plantations  in  favour  of 
contracting. 
Contract farming is not without significant transaction costs.  Dietrich (1994) identifies four 
broad classes of transaction costs likely to be incurred by an agribusiness firm setting up a 
contractual arrangement with smallholders: (i) costs of drafting, negotiating and enforcing 
contracts, (ii) maladaption costs when contract  specifications are not met, (iii) set-up and 
running  costs  associated  with  governance  and  (iv)  bonding  costs  of  effecting  secure 
commitments.  A firm deciding to enter into a contractual arrangement with smallholders has 
come to the conclusion that transaction costs associated with this arrangement are less than 
either  trying  to  work  through  the  spot  market  or  vertically  integrating  through  plantation 
production.  In seeking smallholders to contract with, firms must consider transaction costs as 
well as production costs.   5 
Applying the same framework to smallholders, specific benefits from contracting may include 
reduced costs of: (i) accessing product markets, (ii) getting credit (iii) providing employment 
for family members (iv) managing risk and (v) obtaining market and agronomic information.  
Thus, contracting should be attractive to small scale farmers who are constrained in credit and 
labour  markets  and  who  cannot  achieve  economies  to  scale  in  gathering  information  or 
accessing  markets.    Such  farmers  may  be  attractive  to  firms  due  to  their  low  costs  of 
production, particularly in HVF crops that are labour intensive. 
2.2  Empirical Framework 
Two issues that arise in analysing contract farming concern whether contracts improve returns 
on  smallholder capital and what types of smallholders might benefit from contracts.  If, as 
hypothesized,  contract  farming  allows  smallholders  to  reduce  transaction  costs,  then  this 
should result in an improved capital return where capital includes human capital, land and 
machinery and, where labour markets are constrained, family labour.  To capture this effect 
using econometric techniques, a gross margin equation is specified in Section 5.  Farm gross 
margin is defined as the contribution made to farm income by each component of capital and 
the econometric equation is specified with variables for different types of capital, constraints 
on use of capital arising from transaction costs and a zero-one variable indicating contract 
participation. The coefficient on the zero-one variable is then interpreted as measuring the 
monetary impact of the contract on farm returns.    
Since participation in contract farming could be endogenous (jointly determined with gross 
margins) we test for endogeneity and report results of a two stage estimation procedure along 
with the normal linear regression.  Given contract participation is a zero-one variable, a two 
stage  estimation  procedure  is  adopted  from  Angrist  (2000).    In  the  first  stage,  a  linear 
probability  model  of  likelihood  of  selection  for  the  contract,  a  participation  equation,  is 
specified  as  a  function  of  smallholder  attributes  and  then,  in  the  second  stage,  the  gross 
margin  equation  is  estimated  using  the  forecast  of    likelihood  from  stage  one  as  an 
explanatory variable.  
As well as ensuring unbiased estimates, the estimation of the contract participation equation 
provides insight into whether participation is based on self-selection or selection by Pioneer.  
For example, if contractors are better educated is this because Pioneer prefers better educated 
contractors?    Similarly,  does  Pioneer  select  smallholders  with  more  land  or  are  ‘larger’ 
smallholders selecting themselves for the contract?   In this context, the participation equation 
is interesting for more than just resolving methodological issues about simultaneity bias.  It   6 
provides  insight  into  the  characteristics  of  smallholders  who  contract.    That  is,  whether 
contracting households are different from other households – do they own more land, are they 
better educated, what types of smallholders are likely to be found participating in contracts, 
what are the constraints on participation?  Answers to these questions provide understanding 
of the constraints faced by smallholders wishing to participate in contracts and of how farm-
level policy might be formulated to support contract farming.  The standard econometric for 
examining a zero-one variable such as participation is through the use of probit regression.  
For the analysis of participation we therefore include both the results of the probit estimation 
and the linear probability estimation which we use in the two-stage procedure. 
3.  Seed Corn Contract 
Pioneer is a multi-national corporation (MNC) growing a range of high value agricultural 
products in many countries including Australia.  In Indonesia, Pioneer grows only hybrid seed 
corn which is produced only in East Java.  Thirty to forty per cent of this seed is exported 
mainly to the Philippines with small amounts to Thailand and Japan with the remaining 60-70 
per cent sold domestically.  It first offered contracts for the production of hybrid seed corn to 
East Javanese smallholders in 1986.  At present there are between 40 and 50 grower groups 
participating in the contract each year with a total of about 10,000 contracted growers in East 
Java.  Average plantings are around 0.2 ha and total plantings by Pioneer contractors last year 
were around 2000 ha.  Production was around 7000 tonnes which was cleaned, screened, 
sized, tested and packaged in the plant in Malang for sale in small packs (1, 5 and 40 kg) and 
jumbo packs of 1000 kg. 
There is only one quality standard although different varieties are grown.  Only 40-50 per cent 
of  delivered  seed  meets  the  standard  and  seed  not  reaching  this  standard  is  sold  as 
consumption corn.   All seed delivered to the plant is accepted regardless of quality  with 
quality issues dealt with through exclusion of poor performers from future contracts and by 
spotting problems in the field prior to harvest.  Pioneer says ‘if growers follow guidelines then 
quality problems are ‘bad luck’ and costs will be borne by the company’.  The cost of this risk 
is probably spread over all growers through offer prices.   7 
The price paid to growers is 130 per cent over the prevailing spot price for consumption corn. 
Currently spot price for consumption corn is around Rp. 500  per kg
4 compared to a contract 
price of around Rp. 1150  per kg.  (Yield from contracted corn is around 6 tonnes per ha 
compared to consumption corn yield of 12 tonnes per ha.)  Inputs provided by Pioneer include 
foundation  seed,  money  for  land  preparation,  physical  inputs  (chemicals)  and  extension 
services.  Costs of these inputs (except extension services) are deducted from the post-harvest 
payment for the crop with Pioneer organising funding through a commercial bank. 
Negotiation, for single season contracts only, occurs at grower group level between Pioneer 
and the ketua kelompok tani (Head of the Grower Group, HGG) who represents the interests 
of growers in his group. Negotiations also involve the kepala desa, (village mayor), local 
politicians and government extension officers. These parties do not actively negotiate, rather, 
they  perform  two  other  roles.    First,  their  presence  legitimises  the  outcome  of  the 
negotiations.  Second, if a dispute arises they  act as intermediaries or ‘referees’.  There is a 
written agreement at group level  signed by the HGG, politicians and extension officers with 
verbal agreements between growers and the HGG.  Thus, the contract selection problem for 
Pioneer is primarily at grower group level with the selection decision taking into account 
distance from plant, irrigation, previous corn experience and disease and rodent problems. 
Pioneer provides one extension officer for every one or two villages. They provide advice to 
growers on husbandry, monitor the crop and provide feedback to Pioneer.  The staff member 
is likely to have an undergraduate degree in agriculture and come from a farming background.  
These are company people who move around geographically during their careers and have 
performance assessed on the basis of contract success. 
Cross-pollination  with  other  corn  crops  can  contaminate  hybrid  corn  seed  and  render  it 
unregisterable as certified seed.  Thus, Pioneer insists that all corn grown by a smallholder 
group (a specified geographical area) must be Pioneer hybrid seed corn.  Since a neighbouring 
village or farmer  group is a potential source of contamination, Pioneer may need to  also 
capture  their  production,  hence,  clusters  of  contracting  groups  occur.    Individuals  not 
participating in the contract may receive a payment from the company for not growing corn if 
they have a previous history of growing corn.  In this situation, the grower surrenders use of 
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the land for the growing season and a hybrid corn crop is planted  by another grower.  The 
compensation, called ‘rent’, is set at the gross margin for consumption corn.  Usually at most 
only three or four growers in the group are affected by this arrangement.  
Pioneer employs around 30 full time staff at Head Office in Malang in management and 
administrative positions in the office and processing facility.  There are an additional 300 
people employed in the processing facility on a part-time basis of whom around half are 
female.  In addition, hybrid seed corn husbandry is labour intensive.  For example, it takes 60 
people one day to de-tassle one hectare and many day labourers are employed casually at 
specific points in the growing cycle. 
Finally, Pioneer faces competition for smallholders to produce seed corn from Monsanto and 
PC, both MNCs.  These firms are more diversified than Pioneer.  Competition is for groups 
and villages though it is not clear how fierce this competition is.  
4.  Survey Results 
4.1  Background 
The survey was undertaken in April, 2002 by Balai Pengkajian Teknologi Pertanian, East 
Java (the East Javanese branch of the national agricultural research agency, BPTP) and the 
authors  assisted  in  training  enumerators,  testing  the  survey  and  supervision  of  the  field 
survey.  Ten  dusun  (hamlets)  were  chosen  from  seven  desa  (villages)  within  the  two 
kecamatan (districts) of Tajinan and Sumber Pucung in East Java.   
A  community  level  survey  was  conducted  at  dusun  level  with  local  officials.  The  dusun 
averaged 539 households with the smallest having 102  and largest 1316 with households 
predominantly employed in agriculture (96 per cent).  In terms of development indicators, the 
survey showed 90 per cent of households had mains electricity, 86 per cent mains water and 4 
per cent had a telephone in the household. The major agricultural activities are horticulture 
and crops, mainly rice, and livestock production was minimal with an average of 37 cattle per 
dusun.  However,  with  one  dusun  reporting  236  cattle,  the  latter  distribution  was  highly 
skewed. 
Smallholders in all ten dusun had contracts with Pioneer and 150 contracting households were 
randomly  selected  from  these.  A  further  150  households  not  involved  with  Pioneer  were 
randomly selected from across the ten dusun giving a total sample 300 households. A final   9 
sample of 289 smallholder survey forms were used, 144 non-contractors and 145 contractors.  
In  all,  11  forms  were  not  usable  due  to  the  inability  to  contact  and  survey  selected 
smallholders, gaps in the data due to bad enumeration and, because of the late discovery of 
these  problems,  difficulties  ‘getting  back’  to  the  household  for  clarification.  We  have  no 
reason to believe these problems will create bias in the sample.  
Of the 145 contractors only six had been contracting since the inception of the contract in 
1986, 90 per cent had less than seven years experience and around half had at most three 
years of experience contracting to Pioneer. Thirty per cent had not participated in at least one 
season  of  the  contract  since  their  first  contractual  year.  These  figures  indicate  significant 
levels of entry to and exit from the contract over time.  
4.2  Key Measures 
Table 1 provides comparisons of average values for key variables for participants and non-
participants in the seed corn contract.  Heads of households (HOHs) were mainly males with 
only three females (widows) in the sample. The average age of HOHs was 51  years and 
HOHs had an average of 6.7 years of formal schooling.  Average household size was 4.1 with 
a household ‘member’ defined as any person residing full-time in the house for at least six of 
the previous 12 months.  On average, 23 per cent of household members were aged less than 
14 years or greater than 65 years and defined for purposes of the study as dependents.  There 
was a significant difference in the average length of time that land had been managed by the 
two groups with non-contractors having managed their land longer than contractors. This may 
reflect  that  non-contractors  tended  to  be  older.  In  contrast,  there  were  no  differences  in 
household size or education levels. 
Land is the most valuable asset for these households in terms of both contribution to income 
and to prestige.  Smallholders own on average 0.47 ha and rent in 0.18 ha with most of this 
being irrigated land (0.48 ha).  Land owned and under management was significantly lower 
for the non-contract group and contractors have significantly higher levels of rented in land.   
Contractors  also  have  significantly  more  irrigated  land.    On  average,  households  own 
agricultural assets worth Rp. 284,000 including rotary hoes, water pumps, thrashers and small 
planting,  weeding  and  harvesting  equipment.  There  is  a  much  larger  investment  in  non-
agricultural assets such as cars, motorbikes and televisions with an average of Rp 4.5 million 
worth of non-agricultural assets per household.  The approximate value per household for all 
livestock is Rp. 2.24 million with the latter assets likely to be playing an important role as a   10 
source of savings and production.  In general, contractors are more likely to have higher 
levels of asset ownership, have taken out more loans in the previous two years and have more 
savings. 
Sixty three per cent of total household labour was used on farm with 53 per cent of total 
household  income  generated  through  on-farm  activities.  Clearly,  households  are  still 
predominantly farming households however significant levels of income are generated off-
farm.    Non-contracting  households  used  20  per  cent  more  household  labour  in  off-farm 
activities  reflecting  the  likelihood  that  contract  farming  creates  on-farm  employment 
opportunities.  On average, non-contractors obtained 60 per cent of their income from off-
farm sources compared to 39 per cent for contractors. 
Membership  of  community  groups  and  participation  in  community  activities  provides  an 
indication of links between households and the community and were used as a proxy for 
social capital in the study.  HOHs belonged to an average of 2.1 community groups with an 
average  membership  duration  of  8.1  years  and  24  per  cent  of  HOHs  had  or  were  group 
leaders.  The level of ‘giving’ for community activities such as village festivals and building 
funds  may  also  provide  evidence  of  social  capital  and  seemed  relatively  high  across  the 
sample at Rp. 900,000 for the previous 12 months. 
Contractors are more likely to be a member of a community  group however this reflects 
compulsory membership of contractors in the Pioneer group. If Pioneer group membership is 
not included then the reverse result holds true; non-contractors are more likely to be members 
of community groups.  Participation in contract farming may crowd out other community 
activities. 
4.3  Gross Margins 
 
A gross margin (GM) analysis was undertaken to provide an overview of the smallholder 
farming systems and initial comparisons between contractor and non-contractor sources of 
income.  In Table 2 total farm GM is disaggregated by farm inputs to provide comparisons of 
input use between contractors and non-contractors and, in Table 3, average GMs and areas for 
individual crops are reported. 
Cropping  activities  are  the  most  important  sources  of  on-farm  income  in  the  study  area.  
There are three major crops grown by smallholders: rice, corn and sugar cane.  Rice is the 
dominant crop with contractors and non-contractors planting 30 and 25 per cent of their land   11 
respectively to rice.  Non-contractors tend to plant greater areas to consumption corn (12 per 
cent  compared  to  8  per  cent)  and  sugar  cane  (17  per  cent  as  compared  to  13  per  cent). 
Contractors, however, grow seed corn which more than compensates for these differences.  
Contractors plant, on average, 22 per cent of their available land to seed corn.   
Seed corn provides the highest GM of the major crops with a return nearly 20  per cent higher 
than rice and sugar cane grown by contract farmers.  Seed corn also has the highest input 
costs and returns per hectare.  It uses significantly higher fertiliser, pesticide and non-family 
labour. It may be that, unlike with other crops, extra labour is paid in cash rather as a portion 
of yield (bawon).  In general, contract farmers produce crops that have higher GMs/ha than 
crops  grown  by  non-contractors.  Sixty  per  cent  of  contract  farmers  obtain  above-median 
GMs/ha for rice compared to only 40 per cent of non-contractors.  The reasons for this may be 
either that better farmers are selected for the contract or the experience of growing a crop with 
the support of a large multinational company supplying regular innovative advice have made 
these farmers better than those who, with similar resource bases, have not had the benefit of 
this relationship. 
Corn is often retained for household use and a possible reason for the low GMs apart from 
crop failure and poor management is that smallholders have difficulty estimating the yield of 
a commodity which they do not sell. The regularity and extent of corn growing implies that 
smallholders do regard it as an important crop for household food security.  
Sugar cane is comparable with rice but has the disadvantage of being an annual crop and 
hence large outlays are required with returns not being generated until one year later.  Sugar 
cane is not as ‘cash flow friendly’ as rice and is declining in popularity in East Java as (world) 
price continues to decline. The survey did not distinguish between first year and ratoon sugar 
plantings. 
The  only  significant  difference  in  land  use  (Table  3)  between  smallholder  groups  is  that 
contractors plant significantly larger areas of rice than do non-contractors. This translates into 
significantly higher cropping and, with seed corn areas also included, significantly higher on-
farm GMs. With regard to other agricultural activities, there are no significant differences 
between contractors and non-contractors with regard to tree crops (timber, fruit, plantations), 
mixed crops and sugarcane.    12 
5.  Model Specification and Empirical Results 
5.1  Contract Participant Selection 
Pioneer selects at group level for its contract and groups are selected on the basis of their 
previous contractual performance, disease and pest status and proximity to both other groups 
and to the plant in Malang.  Selection at smallholder level is undertaken by a decision process 
occurring  within  the  group.    We  are  interested  in  identifying  the  characteristics  of 
smallholders  who  participate  in  the  contract  and  the  extent  to  which  they  are  either  self 
selecting or their selection effectively reflects the preferences of Pioneer acting through its 
agency within the group.  There are a number of ways smallholders may derive benefits from 
the Pioneer contract that would encourage them to self select for the contract:   
1.  The  contract  helps  spread  risk  which  should  be  favoured  by  those  with  limited 
opportunities for offsetting risks such as smaller, less diversified farms with limited 
access to credit or older (more risk averse) farmers.   
2.  The contract provides information on production and marketing of crops hence should 
be  attractive  to  less  educated  and  ‘smaller’  farmers  unable  to  achieve  scale  in 
information gathering.   
3.  The  contract  increases  on-farm  demand  for  labour  hence  should  be  attractive  to 
farmers with larger households facing high costs obtaining off-farm work.   
4.  The contract provides credit and advances of farm inputs hence should be attractive to 
farmers facing high borrowing costs. 
5.  Contracting is a group activity hence should be attractive to farmers with experience 
with agricultural and community groups. 
If these factors contribute to the likelihood of contract participation then farmers are likely to 
be self-selecting since the contract is attracting those smallholders that benefit most.  If these 
factors do not contribute to likelihood of selection then the alternative hypothesis, that Pioneer 
effectively does the selecting, is preferred.  The latter is especially the case if size or scale 
contributes to likelihood of participation since larger farms may have lower unit costs making 
them attractive candidates for selection by Pioneer. 
Initially, a probit analysis was conducted using the explanatory variables listed in Table 4.  
Land enters the analysis as three variables: land owned, land rented in and land rented out.  It 
is assumed land rental arrangements are fixed in the short run and these categories of land are   13 
viewed differently by smallholders for management purposes.  The three land variables can  
be viewed collectively as approximating total land under management and hence capture both 
land  investment  and  scale  effects.    Two  types  of  labour,  household  labour  and  off-farm 
labour, are specified with large households hypothesised to be more likely to participate in 
contracts  and  households  with  off-farm  work  less  likely.    Farm  machinery  is  a  sunk 
investment with high transaction costs in re-selling or renting out and hence its ownership is 
hypothesised to increase the likelihood of contract participation.  Credit enters the model as 
two  variables.    First,  as  a  zero-one  variable  denoting  whether  the  smallholder  is  credit 
constrained and, second,  as number of loans taken out in the last two years.  Smallholders 
were deemed to be credit constrained if they had not borrowed in the previous two years 
despite reporting that they needed to borrow.  Human capital is captured through age of the 
head of household and zero-one variables for his or her education level.  Older or better 
educated smallholders have more experience and knowledge and hence derive less benefit 
from contract participation.  Social capital is captured through the number of community 
groups,  including  agricultural  groups,  household  members  participate  in  and  by  another 
variable for the number of agricultural groups the head of the household belongs to.    
Table 5 reports the marginal contribution, evaluated at the sample mean, of each variable to 
the likelihood function and its associated z value.  The results indicate the probability of 
entering a contract increases positively with the size of the enterprise measured by land under 
long-term management and with activity in credit markets.  Contractors are younger, likely to 
belong to more farm groups but less community groups and their education level is irrelevant.   
Thus, the alternative hypothesis seems most plausible.  That is, farmers are unlikely to be self-
selecting and Pioneer effectively selects farmers who are larger, in terms of land under long-
term management, presumably to get more reliable supply at lower unit cost.  The probit 
model predicted contractors correctly 69 per cent of the time and non-contractors 73 per cent 
of the time (Table 6). 
5.2  Contracting and Gross Margins  
Empirical  testing  was  undertaken  to  determine  whether  contracting  contributed  to  gross 
margins where the latter were defined as the return to land, machinery and human capital.  
The gross margin equation was specified as: 
 
  e b a a + + + = i i i x status gm 2 1  14 
 
where  gmi  is  gross  margins  for  smallholder  i,  statusi  =    0  for  non-contractors  and  1  for 
contractors  and  xi  is  a  vector  of  exogenous  variables:  mahhage,  educdum1,  educdum2, 
mfahown,  mfharent,  mfout  and  magass  (Table  4)  and  i e   is  an  error  term  with  the  usual 
constraints. 
An empirical issue arises over whether status is endogenous and this was dealt with using the 
following  steps.    A  two  stage  least  squares  specification  was  estimated  using  the  linear 
probability model in the first stage and the forecast of status from this equation was used as 
an  explanatory  variable  in  the  second  stage  where  gross  margins  were  estimated  using 
ordinary least squares (Angrist, 2000).  The variables used in the first stage were similar to 
those  in  the  probit  analysis  (Table  7).    The  Hausman  test  was  then  conducted  and  the 
hypothesis that status is endogenous rejected using the student t test (Doran, 1989, pp. 356-
61).  The gross margins equation was then re-estimated using ordinary least squares.  The 
results using the two stage least squares (Table 8) and ordinary least squares estimators (Table 
9) were almost equivalent with R
2 for the OLS result being 0.472 compared to 0.464 for the 
2SLS result and coefficient magnitudes and standard errors were much the same. 
The results indicate that status contributes to profits after controlling for the effects of land 
and farm machinery and education and age of household head.  Focussing on the ordinary 
least squares results, all of the coefficients were significant at the 0.01 level except status, 
significant  at  the  0.05  level,  and  age  and  one  of  the  educational  dummies  which  was 
insignificant.  It appears kindergarten education level contributed to profitability over ‘no 
education’ however more advanced education had no effect.  The insignificant coefficient on 
the age variable may indicate a threshold level of years of experience was all that was needed 
for  additional  profitability  and,  given  the  older  sample,  all  had  met  it.    Testing  with  a 
quadratic term for age failed to capture such a threshold as a non-linearity.  The coefficient on 
status was Rp. 1.33m (USD147) compared to a mean value of gm of Rp. 3.69m (USD410) 
across the sample.  With average household income per annum around Rp. 9.5m (USD1,054), 
selection for the contract is, on average, welfare increasing, though not hugely so. 
6.  Discussion and Conclusions 
Transaction cost theory predicts that a contract such as the Pioneer seed corn example in East 
Java  will  be  successful  in  terms  of  both  its  persistence  and  the  benefits  conferred  on 
participants if it results in sustainable reductions in transaction costs.  From the description of   15 
the contract in Section 3 and of the raw survey results in Section 4, most of the benefits that 
might  be  expected  to  accrue  to  smallholders  from  this  type  of  contract  are  extant  in  the 
Pioneer contract. 
From the smallholder’s perspective, the contract provides a low cost way for smallholders to 
access seed corn markets using Pioneer’s well established international marketing network.  
Without this network, and the processing facility in Malang that supports it, it seems unlikely 
this product would be produced on any scale, if at all, by these smallholders.  The contract 
provides  a  credit  facility  in  cash  and  kind  and  as  such  it  allows  constraints  faced  by 
smallholders in credit markets to be overcome with collateralisation of future production and 
reduced  borrowing  costs  resulting  in  credit  at  commercial  bank  rates.    The  contract  also 
allows  production  diversification,  reduces  risk  associated  with  high  cost  farm  inputs  and 
provides a  guarantee of price regardless of quality.   No evidence was  found of contracts 
dominating farm plans and reducing diversification and high levels of entry to and exit from 
the contract indicated there was little if any dependence on the contract in meeting basic 
income needs.  Finally, growers participating in the contract receive high quality information 
on how to grow a technically complex crop in a situation where it is unlikely that the same 
type of technical help could come from government extension services. 
The results of the probit analysis indicated smallholders were unlikely to be self-selecting and 
hence smallholders who might have benefited most from the contract were not necessarily 
selected.    However,  the  gross  margin  analysis  indicated  that  the  smallholders  who  were 
selected experienced enhanced profitability.  That is, the contract allowed them to make more 
productive use of their capital. 
Glover and Kusterer (1990), Runsten and Key (1996) and Key and Runsten (1999) argue that 
farm contracts in developing countries often fail, hence, it is interesting to conjecture why the 
Pioneer contract has been successful. We believe that the striking difference between the 
Pioneer contract and those reported elsewhere is the way the institution of the grower group 
works within the contract. Glover and Kusterer (1990) and Singh (2000) report NGOs acting 
as intermediaries between agribusiness firms and smallholders in Central America and that 
grower representative groups often perform political and negotiation tasks in contract farming 
situations in developed countries. However, the grower groups we found in East Java were 
traditional,  reflecting  the  need  for  careful  management  of  irrigation  systems  over  the 
centuries, and were led by HGGs who could exercise considerable power over the commercial 
decision making of individual members.      16 
Pioneer gets tangible benefits from dealing with groups rather than individuals.  The costs of 
drafting, negotiating and enforcing contracts are lower if the firm negotiates with 40 to 50 
HGGs rather than 10,000 individual smallholders. Grower differences within the groups can 
be solved internally using traditional dispute resolution systems and written contracts need 
only be struck with the HGGs.  In terms of enforcement costs, Pioneer benefits by selecting 
contract participants at group level rather than individual level since, providing the contract 
serves collective interests, the group has incentives to deal with contractually errant members. 
Enforcement costs, an important source of contract failure elsewhere, becomes a problem that 
can be dealt with by the group using its existing power structure. Maladaption costs when 
contract specifications are not met are also an important source of contract failure. Pioneer is 
in  the  enviable  position  of  being  able  to  sell  sub-standard  seed  corn  to  the  consumption 
market hence can offset some of the costs incurred when quality is below standard. However, 
again, the grower group plays a role in preventing maladaption to the contract. Members have 
a  collective  interest  in  preventing  any  individual  from  departing  from  Pioneer’s  growing 
guidelines since this would jeopardise the contract for the whole group and not just for the 
errant member. Set-up and running costs associated with governance are greatly reduced in a 
group environment since the Pioneer field employee works at grower group level. His costs of 
conflict  resolution  are  reduced  by  the  collective  nature  of  grower  interests  and  regular 
meetings of the group allow him to spend less time face-to-face with individuals. Finally, 
financial transactions are supervised by the HGG at group level including grower payments 
and provision of contracted inputs. We concluded that Pioneer achieves transacting scale by 
contracting  with  farmer  groups  that  are  like  small  firms  with  powerful  Chief  Executive 
Officers rather than with many individual smallholders and that this accounts at least partly 
for the success of the contract.   17 
References 
Angrist, J. (2000), Estimation of limited dependent variable models and zero-one endogenous 
regressors: simple strategies for empirical practice.  NBER Technical Working Paper 
248, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Birchall, C.C.  (2002), pers. com., School of Rural Science & Agriculture, University of New 
England.  
Clapp,  R.A.J.  (1988),  Representing  reciprocity,  reproducing  domination:  ideology  and  the 
labour process in Latin American contract farming, Journal of Peasant Studies 16(1), 
5-39. 
Commonwealth  Development  Corporation  (CDC)  (1989),  Review  of  Smallholder 
Development Programs, Vols 1 & 2, London.  
Coulter, J., Goodland, A., Tallonaire, A. and R. Stringfellow (1999), Marrying Farmer Co-
operation and Contract Farming for Agricultural Service Provision in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Guide to Developing Agricultural Markets and Agro-Enterprises Series, World 
Bank. 
de Janvrey, A., Fafchamps, M. and E. Sadoulet (1991), Peasant household behaviour with 
missing  markets:  some  paradoxes  explained,  Economic  Journal  101(November), 
1400-1417. 
Dietrich, M. (1994), Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond, Routledge, London.  
Doran, H.E. (1989), Applied regression analysis in econometrics, Marcel Dekker, Inc. New 
York and Basel. 
Dorward,  A.  (2001),  The  effects  of  transaction  costs,  power  and  risk  on  contractual 
arrangements:  a  conceptual  framework  for  quantitative  analysis,  Journal  of 
Agricultural Economics 52(2), 59-73. 
Eaton,  C.  and  A.W.  Shepherd  (2001), Contract  Farming:  Partnerships  for  Growth,  FAO 
Agricultural Services Bulletin 145, Food and Agricultural Organisation, Rome. 
Friedland, W. (1994) ‘The new globalisation: the case of fresh produce, in A. Bonanno et al. 
(eds) From Columbus to Conagra, University of Kansas Press. 
Glover, D. and K. Kusterer  (1990), Small Farmers, Big Business: Contract Farming and 
Rural Development, Macmillan, London. 
Goodman D. and M.J. Watts (eds) (1997), Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions and Global 
Restructuring, Routledge, London. 
Hayami, Y. and K. Otsuka (1993), The Economics of Contract Choice, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Key,  N.  and  D.  Runsten  (1999),  Contract  farming  in  Africa:  an  application  of  the  new 
institutional economics, World Development, 27(2), 38-401.   18 
Jaffee, S. (1994), Exporting High Value Food Commodities, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Key, N and D. Runsten (1999), Contract farming, smallholders, and rural development in 
Latin America: the organisation of agroprocessing firms and the scale of outgrower 
production, World Development 27(2), 381-401. 
Little,  P.D.  and  M.J.  Watts  (eds)  (1994),  Living  under  Contract:  Contract  Farming  and 
Agrarian Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Madison, University of Wisconsin 
Press. 
Runsten,  D.  (1992),  Transaction  costs  in  Mexican  fruit  and  vegetable  contracting: 
implications  for  Association  and  Participation,  Paper  presented  at  the  XVIII 
International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta. 
Singh, S. (2000), Theory and practice of contract farming: a review, Journal of Social and 
Economic Development, 3(2), 255-63. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (1974), Incentive and risk sharing in sharecropping, Review of Economic Studies 
41(2), 219-256. 
Torres, G. (1997), The Force of Irony: Power in Everyday Life of Mexican Tomato Workers, 
Oxford Press, Oxford. 
Williamson,  O.E.  (1979),  Transaction  cost  economics:  the  governance  of  our  contractual 
relations, Journal of Law and Economics, 22:233-62.  
Wilson, A. (1990), The political economy of contract farming, Review of Radical Political 
Economics 18(4), 47-70.  
   19 
Tables 
Table 1: Characteristics of smallholder households 
 
 









Age of household head (yrs)  51.3  50.1  52.5  1.77*  H/hold char. 
Education of hh head (yrs)  6.7  6.8  6.6  -0.29 
  Dependency percentage (%)  23  21  25  1.85* 
  Number of persons per hh  4.1  4.1  4.1  0.13 
  Land managed by hh (yrs)  14.1  12.7  15.6  2.18** 
Total value of ag. assets (Rp.’000)  284  367  201  -1.67*  Assets 
Total value of non-ag. assets (Rp.m)  4.5  5.0  4.0  -0.9 
  Area of land owned (ha)  0.47  0.51  0.44  -1.18 
  Area of land rented (ha)  0.18  0.25  0.11  -3.36*** 
  Area of land owned and rented (ha)  0.65  0.76  0.55  -3.27*** 
  Area of irrigated land worked (ha)  0.48  0.59  0.36  -4.62*** 
  Area of land rented out (ha)  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.12 
  No. of loans started in the last 2 years  0.48  0.57  0.40  -1.94* 
  Smallholders who have savings (%)  42  47  36  3.46* 
  Value of livestock (Rp.m)  2.24  2.43  2.06  -0.7 
  Value of all assets (Rp.m)  45.8  51.6  39.9  -2.08** 
Labour use  Tot. labour days spent off-farm  173  160  187  1.34 
  Off-farm income, % of total income  50  39  60  4.80***
 
  On farm labour use, % of total  63  68  57  -3.07** 
Community 
links 
Group membership (no.)  1.7  1.4  1.9  2.16** 
  Group membership incl Pioneer group (no.)  2.1  2.4  1.9  -2.33** 
  Spent on community activities (Rp.m)  0.9  1.1  0.7     -1.31 
 
Test of difference between contractors and non-contractors using t-test or Pearson chi
2 as appropriate. 
 
*significant at the 90% level, ** significant at the 95% level, *** significant at the 99% level. 
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Table 2: Crop GMs per hectare per season, contract and non-contract farmers 
 
 
Rice  Seed 
Corn 

























Income   5,394  4,054  6,294  2,778  2,296  3,802  3,384 
Costs                
Seed  77  88  0  38  36  209  296 
Fertiliser  669  610  965  698  638  492  481 
Pest control  70  69  192  68  54  4  0 
Weed control  10  1  21  16  1  2  0 
Labour  662  675  985  821  839  122  159 
Draft  236  320  139  126  229  1  0 
Spray equipment  2  4  0  1  6  0  0 
Water pump  0  101  0  1  1  1  0 
191  76 
244 
132  46  131  126 
Bawon  271  249  0  23  74  1  408 
Total Cost  2,188  2,608  2,547  1,924  1,923  964  1,469 
Gross Margin  3,206  1,850  3,744  854  373  2,838  1,915 
 
* Sugar cane is an annual crop while rice and corn are seasonal, in order to be able to compare GMs all income 
and input costs for sugar cane have been divided by three. Barongan costs are contract services costs paid as a 
set fee, bawon costs are costs for services paid as a percentage of yield. 
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Table  3:  Testing  for  differences  between  areas  of  crop  sown  and  gross  margins; 
contractors and non-contractors 
 







Area  Corn (ha.)  0.20  0.17  0.22  1.25 
  Rice (ha.)  0.56  0.68  0.44  -2.79*** 
  Sugar Cane (ha.)  0.08  0.07  0.09  0.86 
  Mixed crops (ha.)  0.02  0.02  0.02  -0.39 
  Tree crops (ha.)  0.06  0.05  0.07  1.22 
Gross Margin  Corn (Rp.m/hh)  0.14  0.13  0.14  0.32 
  Rice (Rp.m/hh)  1.51  2.13  0.89  -3.63*** 
  Sugar Cane (Rp.m/hh)  0.61  0.60  0.62  0.10 
  Total crop# (Rp.m/hh)  2.76  3.49  2.01  -2.54** 
  Total tree crop (Rp.m/hh)  0.42  0.37  0.46  0.64 
  Total livestock (Rp.m/hh)  0.79  1.01  0.57  -0.75 
  Total farm (Rp.m/hh)  5.00  6.90  3.10  -3.89*** 
  Total off-farm (Rp.m/hh)  4.5  4.4  4.6  0.19 
 
# not including Pioneer seed corn crop. 
 
Test of difference between contractors and non-contractors using t-test. 
 
** significant at the 95% level, *** significant at the 99% level,  
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Table 4: list of variables in the statistical analyses 
 
 
mahhage  age of h/hold head 
educdum1  education of h/hold head = kindergarden 
educdum2  education of h/hold head = greater than kindergarden 
mhhlab  number of working age members (14 - 65 years) in each 
h/hold 
mofflab  days of h/hold labour spent working off-farm 
mfhaown  number of hectares owned by h/hold  
mfharent  number of hectares rented in by each h/hold 
mfout  number of hectares rented out by each h/hold 
magass  value of agricultural machinery owned by h/hold 
mqcred  credit constrained (= 0) opr unconstrained (= 1) 
mqnoloan  number of loans taken out in previous two years 
mshhgp  number  of  community  (including  agricultural)  groups 
that h/hold members are members of 
groupdum1  belong to one agricultural group 
groupdum2  belong to two agricultural groups 
groupdum3  belong to more than two agricultural groups 
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Table  5:  Results for probit  analysis  showing  marginal  probabilities  and  associated  z 
values 
  dF/dx  z 
mahhage  -.0075054  -2.45 
educdum1  0.0043247  0.05 
educdum2  -0.0440127  -0.44 
mhhlab  0.0382305  -0.44 
mofflab  -0.0001745  -0.83 
mfhaown  0.0732532  0.99 
mfharent  0.2724795  2.22 
mfout  -0.052439  -0.27 
magass  2.06e-07  1.28 
mqcred  0.12388  1.49 
mqnoloan  0.1252614  2.33 
mshhgp  -0.070098  -2.78 
groupdum1  0.2886221  4.24 
groupdum2  0.5208776  4.59 


















          0  102  37  139 
  73.4%  26.6%  100% 
          1  45  100  145 
  31%  69%  100% 
total  147  137  284 
  52%  48%  100% 
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Table 7: Results for Linear Probability Equation: Coefficients and t Values 
 
  Coefficient  t 
mahhage  -.005313  -2.45 
educdum1  -0.0011671  -0.02 
educdum2  -0.0231731  -0.28 
mhhlab  0.033126  1.41 
mofflab  -0.0001084  -0.59 
mfhaown  0.0828855  1.29 
mfharent  0.2205782  2.77 
mfout  -0.0477264  -0.28 
magass  1.82e-08  0.55 
mqcred  0.1076389  1.48 
mqnoloan  0.1047717  2.51 
mshhgp  -0.0584178  -3.38 
groupdum1  0.255606  4.38 
groupdum2  0.6542701  6.06 
groupdum3  0.3813996  1.15 
constant  0.4567479  2.68 
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Table 8: Results for Two Stage Least Squares Estimation 
 
varname  coef.  t 
status  3029344  2.11 
mahhage  -24294  -0.80 
educdum1  1356288  2.15 
educdum2  1015829  0.87 
mfahown  8764332  5.61 
mfharent  8582245  2.94 
mfout  -1.10e+07  -4.64 
magass  3.061594  7.45 
constant  -1916549  -0.92 
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Table 9: Results for Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 
varname  coef.  t 
status  1323924  1.92 
mahhage  -33152.26  -1.15 
educdum1  1341074  2.13 
educdum2  968006.9  0.83 
mfahown  8370035  5.75 
mfharent  9079874  3.27 
mfout  -1.12e+07  7.50 
magass  3.130021  7.50 
constant  -760024.3  -0.40 
 
 